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THE POLICE SERVICE CONTRACT IN CALIFORNIA
An Instrument of Functional Integration
GORDON E. MISNER
The author is an Associate Professor, Police, San Jose College, California, where he has been a
member of the faculty since 1956. Professor .Misner received his Master's degree from the Univer-
sity of California and has served as a police consultant to a number of agencies especially in the
California area. This paper, his third to appear in our Journal, is based upon a study which has
been underway since 1956.-EDITOR.
There have been a variety of proposals to solve
the presently divisive pattern of metropolitan and
regional law enforcement.' Of these proposals, the
police service contract offers the most feasible and
practical solution. By. this device smaller police
jurisdictions contract formally with a larger police
agency for the provision of law enforcement serv-
ices. No claim is made here that this type of volun-
tary governmental arrangement offers the ideal
solution. This arrangement does offer, however, an
alternative to the presently confused pattern of
police organization: an alternative which is both
simple in application, economically feasible, and
frequently politically practical. Furthermore, this
al)proach-if properly structured-recognizes the
principle of self-determination and leaves to the
smaller jurisdiction a large degree of discretionary
power.
Basically, proposals for the re-organization of
metropolitan police efforts have included the
following objectives: 1. Simplification of metro-
politan law enforcement patterns: 2. enlargement
of police administraitive areas; and 3. integration
and coordination of police efforts throughout the
metropolitan or regional complex. Often, these
proposals have included provision for either com-
pulsory consolidation or for the realignment of
local government generally. In many regions, the
inclusion of compulsion has doomed otherwise
'Cf. GORDON E. MISNER, "Recent developi ients
in metropolitan law enforcement," JOURNAL OF CRIMI-
NAL. LAW, CRIMINOLOGY, AND POLICE SCIENCE, 50:
497-509 (Jan.-Feb., 1960) and 51:265-73 (Jul.-Aug.,
1960) and the references cited therein.
legitimate proposals. Realistically, therefore, it
would seem that proposals for metropolitan re-
organization should include provisions which would
make them politically acceptable. Police service
contracts, properly drawn, offer some immediate
hope of resolving the more pressing problems of
metropolitan law enforcement.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CoNmTAcTs, GENERALLY
Relationships between various units and levels
of government are characteristic of our federal
system of government. The intergovernmental
contract offers simply a more formal and often
more direct extension of this type of arrangement.
Contractual relations developed relatively early
and today represent, in some areas, well developed
techniques of functional integration. In many
states, the traditional concept of the county as a
rural unit of government has been modified, and
the county has assumed an increasing number of
functions which had previously been considered
"municipal." Commensurate with this modification
of the pattern of county government has been the
growth of the "urban county" as a provider of
services to the fringe areas of cities. In California,
the county has also become the principal agent of
contract services.
The earliest form of city-county contractual
relations in California has been traced to 1891.2
In that year the Legislature provided that cities
2
WINSTON CROUCH, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, Vol. XV, 'METROPOLITAN Los ANGELES: A




c-,uld contract with cunties for the perf,)rmnance
of property asbes~ment and tax collection. It was
not until 1907, however, that Los Angeles County
implemented this statute in a contract with the
city of La Verne. Since that time, intergovern-
mental contracts have increased in number and
in scope of application. By 1958, Los Angeles
County was performing by contract more than 28
municipal functions; at that time each of the
county's 61 cities had contracted with the county
for the performance of one or more of these
functions.3 The most elaborate system of contract
services exists between the count" and the city of
Lakewood. Under the "Lakewood Plan," a major-
ity of the services of this city of more than 60,000
population are performed by the county or by
special districts.
4
Contract services to small jurisdictions and to
newly incorporated areas offer the following ad-
vantages: 1. New areas are furnished with service
by a corps of existing specialists, immediately upon
incorporation; 2. smaller jurisdictions with limited
financial resources are provided with a level of
performance which they could not otherwise afford
to provide; 3. fiscal economies result normally
from the pooling of resources and capital invest-
ments, and from the use of already existing super-
visory and administrative hierarchies; 4. economies
will often permit a jurisdiction to extend the level
of service; 5. contracting jurisdictions are not
forced to develop their own integrated agencies;
6. each contract reduces by one the number of
jurisdictions performing a function within a given
region and thereby simplifies an already compli-
cated governmental pattern; 7. the contract system
is flexible in application; and 8. the voluntary
nature of the contractual system permits the
contracting jurisdiction to retain local autonomy
and varying degrees of discretionary -authority.
In order for the above advantages to be realized,
however, great care must be taken in drawing up
the proposed contract. Properly drawn, inter-
governmental contracts offer many of the ad-
vantages found in the borough system of govern-
ment, i.e. centralization of administration and
decentralization of the decision-making power.
Improperly drawn, however, the contract can
3 Los Angeles County, Chief Administrative Officer,
SERVICES PROVIDED BY TIE COUNTY OF Los ANGELES
TO CITIES IN Los ANGELES COUNTY AS OF FEBRUARY 3,
1959.
Lakewood, City Administrator and Los Angeles
County, Chief Administrative Officer, TIE LAKNFXVOO0
PLAN, rev., 1957.
re-ult in diminishing local di.creti,,nary authority
alnmot to the vani.hing point. The cooperative
spirit with which intergovernmental service con-
tracts are entered into is also of major importance.
If the past relationship between jurisdictions has
been characterized by jealousies, animosities, and
suspicions, the contract system oi service is not
the desirable governmental approach. A genuine,
enlightened spirit of intergovernmental coopera-
tiveness appears to be a key to the success of
intergovernmental contracts.
POLICE SERVICE CONTRICTS
Police service contracts and agreements for
the joint handling of functions within the field of
law enforcement are not new. Formal cooperative
arrangements have been slower to develop in the
police field, however, than in some other functions.
By their very nature, police operations are often
controversial. The police function is often the last
to be given up by a political jurisdiction. Further-
more, police services have traditionally been less
measurable than many other governmental serv-
ices. Police service contracts involve agreement
upon a "desirable level of service," an agreement
which has been difficult to achieve in some areas.
Numerous instances exist-both within and
without metropolitan areas-of two or more
departments jointly handling such tasks as
prisoner care, communications, identification and
records, etc. By 1956, for example, there were
reported 423 instances of such agreements between
police agencies in California alone.5 The focus of
this paper, however, will be upon contract systems
which involve the total police function, rather than
a portion of that function. Such instances are more
limited, and to the author's knowledge these are
found in only a few sections of the nation.
The earliest instances of formal contracts for
police service in the broader sense were under-
taken by the Nassau County Police in 1931. This
system was abandoned by Nassau County in
1949 because of the difficulties which that depart-
ment encountered in estimating expenses and in
contending with fluctuating costs.
The most elaborate systems of police service
contracts known to the present author are found
today in Los Angeles and Santa Clara Counties,
California, and in St. Louis County, Missouri.
More limited examples of county performance of
municipal law enforcement by contract are found
Address by William R. MacDougall, q. in CALI-
FORNIA PEACE OFFICER, (Jul.-Aug., 1956) 1. C-27.
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in a small ntumiwr ,of California counties and
elsewhere. In aidition. Atlanta, Georgia, Police
Department has been providing police service to
certain unincorporated areas of Fulton County
since 1952.6 The focus of this paper's attention
will be upon the Los Angeles experience.
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS IN CONTRACT DESIGN
Successful contract design makes it necessary
to take into account a variety of basic considera-
tions.! Many instances of governmental coopera-
tion rest simply upon tacit agreements and under-
standings between department heads. This
cooperative atmosphere of mutual understanding
is to be encouraged and has, in fact, been basic to
complex governmental operation for years. As
governments grow, however, these informal agree-
ments may involve new organizational concepts
and patterns, and involve the expenditure of
increasing sums of money and the deployment of
larger numbers of men. Developments may,
therefore, call for a departure from previous
operating procedures and may make negotiation
of a formal contract desirable. Such a contract
formalizes the previous modus %ieCndi and clearly
delineates areas of responsibility. Furthermore,
when operations involve emergency deployment
under crisis situations-as they so often do in the
police function-contractual relations may outline
previously conceived operating procedures which
have been planned and "built into" the contract.
Although detailed discussion of basic con-
siderations in the design of police service contracts
exceeds the limits of this paper, these considera-
tions should be briefly mentioned. They may be
categorized as follows: 1. theoretical, 2. legal,
3. political, 4. operational, and 5. economic.
Theorctical Considerations
1. Will the contract result in a simplication of
the law enforcement pattern and in the integration
of the police function?
2. Are the administrative area and resources of
tile smaller jurisdiction inadequate to support a
self-sufficient police agency?
3. Will the agency providing the contract police
C MISNER, 01'. CiT., and VIRGIL W. PETERSON,
"Issues and prol,lems of metropolitan area police
services," JOURNuAL Or CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINM OGY,
AND 'OLICE ScIENcr. 48:130-2 (Jul.-Aug., 19 7).
7 For generalizations and recommendations regard-
ing possible forms of intergovernmental cooperation
and considerations pertaining thereto, cf. CRoUcH,
0j,. OTr., pp. 141-52.
services be willing and able to provide an adequate
level of ervice?
4. Does the agency which will provide the police
service possess an enlightened and progressive
service philosophy?
5. Do provisions of the contract provide for an
adequate means of representing the desires and
needs of the smaller jurisdiction?
Legal Considerations
1. In the absence of statute, does the contract
involve an unlawful surrender or delegation of
governmental functions?'
2. Do the terms of the contract unlawfully limit
either party's legislative power or duty?9
3. What is the implication of the contract upon
the smaller jurisdiction's tort liability?
4. Does the contract displace constitutional
officers, e.g. constables, marshalls, etc.?
5. If the contract provides for the merger of
departments, does it provide for the protection of
the job rights, rank, seniority, and pension rights
of absorbed personnel?
Political Considcrations
1. Is the climate of public opinion receptive to
a consideration of the police service contract?
2. Once undertaken, will the decision to enter
into contractual relations have the stability of
permanence?
3. Are there safeguards to assure the contract is
fair to both parties?
4. Does the police agency of the larger juris-
diction enjoy the confidence and respect of the
public?
5. May "human personality factors" of operating
personnel adversely affect the success of the con-
tract performance?
Operational Considerations
1. Can the contract be implemented- with ad-
ministrative convenience?
2. Is the contract design based upon an adequate
analysis of police records and other data necessary
for police planning?
3. Do the terms of the contract or the actual
operating relationships infringe upon the larger
jurisdiction's control and direction of operating
personnel?





4. Is the larger jurisdiction prepared to meet
justified requests and needs of the smaller juris-
diction?
5. Does the command group of the larger juris-
diction recognize the importance of a bilateral flow
of operating information?
Economic Considerations
1. Will the police service contract present an
economically feasible service pattern?
2. Does the contract provide for automatic
periods of review and negotiation?10
3. What are the contract terms in regard to the
division or disposition of fines and forfeitures?
CURRENT EXAMPLES OF POLICE
SERVICE CO'N'TRACTS
Los Angeles County has developed probably the
most extensive system of local intergovernmental
contracts in the nation." By 1954 it already had
an elaborate system. In that year, however, law
enforcement was added as a contract function of
the county government. Beginning with a contract
to provide police service to one city, the Los
Angeles County- Sheriff today administers the
nation's most comprehensive system of police
service contracts. For fiscal 1959, the Los Angeles
County Sheriff provided contract police service for
19 municipalities. Additional contracts are ex-
pected with the incorporation of new cities. Con-
tracts in force provided service for a population
of 380,044 and for a service area of approximately
103 square miles. 2 The size of the cities ranged
10 California law limits the terms of intergovern-
mental contracts to not more than five years. CALIF.
GOVERNMENT CODE. Sec. 51302.
" For a thorough study of the contract system, cf.
HOWARD H. EARLE, CONTRACT LAW ENFORCEMENT
SERVICE BY THE Los ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT, (M.S. Thesis, Public Administration)
mimeo, John W. Donner Pub. #9, School of Public
Administration, University of Southern California,
Los Angeles, 1960, 108pp.
12 The 19 municipalities covered by these contracts
an( their 1960 population are, as follows: Artesia (9,-
500); Bellflower (43,250); Bradbury (551); City of
Industry (844); Dairy Valley (3,464); Duarte (14,681);
Irwindale (1,650); La Puente (21,952); Lakewood
t62,061); Norwalk (73,071); Paramount (26,514);
Pico Rivera (43,872); Rolling Hills (1.469); Rolling
Hills Estates (2,831); Rosemead (16,700); Santa Fe
Springs (12.985); Signal Hill (4,607); South El Monte
t4,765); and Walnut (1,030). Signal Hill abandoned
its contract after a little more than one year of opera-
tion. This will be discussed Infra. In addition to per-
forming "basic law enforcement" for the above areas,
the Los Angeles County Sheriff contracts with more
than fifty cities for one or more of the following func-
tions: 1. business license enforcement; 2. microfilm
records storage; 3. prisoner housing; 4. school crossing
guard service; and 5. bchool safety officer.
from 618 to 88,739. Ten of the municipalities had
less than 10,000 population, while four had more
than 40,000 populations.
Lakewood, California, was the first incorporated
area with which Los Angeles County contracted
for the performance of police services. On April 10,
1954, Lakewood incorporated under the terms of
what is now known in governmental circles as the
"Lakewood Plan.' 3 Under the plan, the city
expected to provide most of its normal services
either by contract with the county government or
by electing to remain within certain special pur-
pose districts. Thirty-two municipal functions,
for example, are presently being performed for
the city by either the county government or by
districts. The "Lakewood Plan," therefore, ac-
tually prepared the groundwork for the present
system of contract police services in Los Angeles
County and in California.
The police ser-ice contract between Lakewood
and Los Angeles County has been chosen for more
detailed discussion than have other areas. This is
not because the Lakewood contract is charac-
teristic of those in California or even within Los
Angeles County. Rather, Lakewood's contract will
be discussed for the following reasons: First, that
city's contract was the first to go into effect in
Los Angeles County; second, the system, as prac-
ticed there, represents perhaps the optimum
development of such a scheme; third, the teris of
the Lakewood contract are more extensive than
are others; and fourth, the working relations be-
tween Lakewood and the County government seem
ideal and this fact has had important consequences
upon the success of the contract system.
Under the Lakewood Plan, the county agrees to
perform five phases of Law enforcement. These
are as follows: 1. basic law enforcement, 2. traffic
law enforcement, 3. school crossing guards, 4.
bicycle license enforcement, and 5. school safety
officer.
Under the agreement covering basic law en-
forcement, the county agrees to provide police
protection throughout the municipality of a type
and at a level which is normally rendered in the
unincorporated portions of the county. The service
includes the enforcement of state statutes and
local ordinances which are similar to county
ordinances enforced by the Sheriff." In considera-
11 Cf. Lakewood, Office of City Administrator and
Los Angeles County. Chief Administrative Officer,
TulE LAKEWOOD PLAN\, rev. 1957.
l It should be noted that the county has been suc-
cessful in encouraging contract cities to pass a set of
basic local ordinances paralleling county ordinances.
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tion of basic law enforcement services, the city
agrees to transfer, assign, and turn over to the
county treasury an amount equal to the fines and
forfeitures collected by the city. Other phases of
police service are supplied to the city on a cost
basis. 5 In 1959 the city paid an hourly rate of
S1.67 for school crossing guards, and $5.87 for
bicycle license enforcement.
City-county contracts contain a "built-in"
review provision for adjusting costs on a strict cost
accounting basis. Consideration is given to both
direct and indirect costs. Elements of direct cost
are as follows:
1. Direct salaries on a productive work-hour
basis. This compensates the County for a
proportionate share of non-productive time
including holidays, vacation, and sick leave.
2. County's retirement contribution and Work-
men's Compensation Insurance premiums
on above salaries.
3. Cost of direct maintenance and operation
items furnished in providing the service.
This includes such items as supplies, equip-
ment usage and mileage payments to em-
ployees.
16
Elements of indirect costs are hs follows:
1. A proration of departmental and divisional
supervisory and service salaries, and the
County's retirement contribution and Work-
men's Compensation Insurance premium
payments on these salaries.
2. A proration of indirect maintenance and
operation expense.
3. General county overhead, compensating the
County for a proportionate part of general
administrative expense, centralized service
activities, and special appropriations of ben-
efit to County Departments. This includes
service activities performed by the Board
of Supervisors, Auditor-Controller, Treas-
urer, Purchasing and Stores, County Coun-
sel, Civil Service Commission Mechanical
Department and Communications Depart-
ment.. Y
For traffic law enforcement in 1959, Lakewood
and other contract cities paid the county $78,400
annually for around-the-clock service b.v one
patrol car. (The Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department currently operates with two-mar cars
Is In order to assure local groups that the charges
represent true costs, the county government instituted
in 1956 an extensive cost accounting system.
Is TE LAKEWOOD PLAN, OP. CYr., p. 5.
'7 IBm., pp. 5-6.
on the early morning and night watches, and with
one-man cars during the day watch.) The elements
of this charge are calculated in terms of one
deputy sheriff hour1
In 1957, Lakewood, with an estimated popula-
tion of 60,674, spent $235,000 on all phases of law
enforcement. For this amount, the city was pro-
vided with 24-hour service by four patrol units,
two assigned essentially to general law enforcement
and two to traffic enforcement. This expenditure
also included the services of an officer to enforce
overtime parking regulations, bicycle license en-
forcement, and the services of a School Safety
Officer. At first glance, it would appear that this
level of law enforcement would be inadequate for
a city of that size. Closer examination, however,
discloses that the city enjoyed other benefits under
its contract system. The city's police service was
not limited simply to that which has been enumer-
ated. In addition, the city had at its disposal the
entire facilities of a large, well-trained, and well-
equipped police agency. The personnel resources
of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department,
with a complement of more than 3,800 personnel,
could provide the city with specialists when their
services were needed. This reservoir of reserve tal-
ent, available only from the resources of a large
organization, is one of the key assets of the
contract system of police services. A large,
well-trained staff provides the city with a "cush-
ion," with a base for flexibility of operation and
with a reservoir of strength and talent which
it could not otherwise afford. Furthermore, Lake-
wood and other contract cities had at their dis-
posal the personnel necessary for temporary and/or
irregular selective enforcement or "saturation"
programs. Special teams could be moved into the
city to the best advantage of both the contract city
and the Sheriff's Department.
Decentralization of the decision-making process
is another key to the success of police service
contracts in Los Angeles County. Police incidents,
by their very nature often give rise to confusion,
to misunderstanding, and to complaint. Within
this frame of reference, such contracts should be
structured to resolve these issues satisfactorily
at the lowest possible level in the command hier-
archy. They should provide, therefore, formally
or informally, some "built-in" structure for the
"1 Letter, from Los Angeles County Auditor-Con-
troller to Sheriff, in: Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, SURVEY Or POLICE SERVICES FOR THtE
CITY OF WEST COVINA, 1957, hereinafter referred to
as the WEST COVINA SURVEY.
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efficacious disposition and resolution of complaints
and matters of confusion and misunderstanding.
For the first four years of its contract with the
county, the city of Lakewood was served by the
personnel of the Norwalk Sheriff's Station, one of
the Sheriff's several district stations. In 1958, a
new Lakewood Sheriff's Station was constructed
in the civic center plaza of Lakewood. Personnel
of this station now serve the population of four
other contract cities as well as certain unincorpo-
rated areas in the vicinity.
Contact between a contract city and the county,
relative to performance of contract terms or ques-
tions about service, is normally between the chief
executive of the city and the commanding officer
of the Sheriff's Station. In the case of Lakewood,
the city's Administrator would contact the Captain
commanding the Lakewood Station. Only in rare
instances, usually involving basic departmental
policy, is it necessary to refer a matter to someone
higher in the sheriff's command echelon. The
Sheriff, for his part, has appointed an Inspector in
his Patrol Division as Liaison Officer with contract
cities.
Relationships between the city of Lakewood and
the Sheriff's Department seem ideal for the success
of the contract system. Officials of the two govern-
ments feel that the system is working especially
well in Lakewood primarily because both parties
want it to work. Each party has the mutual respect
and confidence of the other. Each party is familiar
with some of the problems of the other, and the
relationship has been especially cordial and amic-
able. Such a situation is unusual in many forms of
intergovernmental co-operation; it is phenomenal
in as vital a function as police service. Police
services, perhaps by their very nature, often lend
themselves less readily to sound metropolitan
solution than do some other functions. In many
cases, law enforcement has been virtually ignored
in otherwise comprehensive solutions to metro-
politan problems. Police problems have often
seemed particularly unsuited to metropolitan
resolution. Characteristically, therefore, the police
functions, as well as fire, were among the last to be
added to contract services performed by the county
government in the Los Angeles area. The "era of
good feeling," therefore, which characterizes the
relations between Lakewood and the Sheriff's
Department, is unique.
A perspective of the relations between Lakewood
and the Los Angeles County Sheriff may be gained
by reading the comments of Lakewood's City
Administrator:
It ma- seem an unusual thing to state, but I
honestly, as city administrator, cannot point
out any real problem in our relations with the
County Sheriff. We are more than pleased with
the services rendered and the organizational
setup... if the Lakewood Plan of contractual
relations ever fails, I feel the last thing that will
be done is to set up our own police department.
The key to all this is having a county with a
police setup such as that of Los Angeles to pro-
vide the services. 19
Confidence such as this is not lightly placed. It
stems from the good will exhibited by each party.
The city, for its part is committed to a continua-
tion of the contract system as long as it works to
the best interests of its citizens. Furthermore, city
officials do not attempt to intervene in the actions
of the Sheriff. Police costs are certainly favorable
to the city, and the contract system provides the
city with economical police service, at a level of
service higher than it could afford to provide
through its own police department.
On the Sheriff's part, there is also a commitment
to a continuation of the contract procedure as long
as it is mutually satisfactory. Sheriff's representa-
tives maintain close contact with city officials
and are receptive to institution of selective en-
forcement campaigns. Representatives of the
Sheriff's Department are prepared to work closely
with city officials, to appear before interested
groups in order to maintain "grass roots" accep-
tance to the plan. In this regard, there is little
difference in the Sheriff's procedure and that of
many chiefs of police. Each month the Sheriff
compiles a statistical report regarding the services
of his department and the distribution of crime
and other police hazards. This tabulation is sent
to each contract city and includes incident rates
and service calls throughout the Sheriff's juris-
diction, for each station, and for each contract
city. In this manner, city officials are provided
with current information regarding crime condi-
tions and general law enforcement.
Is the police service contract system feasible
only for newly incorporated cities, or is it possible
to use this device to achieve functional integration
through the absorption of existing departments?
This problem involves considerations which are
beyond the scope of this paper. Some brief com-
ments will be made, however.
The possibility of absorbing existing depart-
ments has been officially considered twice by Los




Angeles County officials. In 1957, the Sheriff's
Department surveyed the city of West Covina on
the request of the city council.20 In 1959, the police
resources of Signal Hill were surveyed Each of
these cities had existing police departments, and
resolution of the personnel aspects of any plan of
absorption became a major objective. As a result
of the West Covina study, the County formalized
a policy which provided that: ". . . upon becoming
members of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, eligible... employees would, by
law, receive all the rights and benefits granted to
County Employees."2 Only employees who had
completed six months' service with the contracting
city would be eligible for affiliation with the county.
The policy further provided that an affiliated
employee would be reduced in rank only when
necessary ".... to bring his performance capacity
into conformity with Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department standards."23 No employees, however,
would suffer a reduction in pay. In the case of
employees reduced in rank, these "... would
continue to receive their present salary until
general salary increases, periodic salary increases
in rank, or promotion raised their salary level."21
At the time of the survey, West Covina had a
population of approximately 42,500. The Police
Department had a complement of 37 personnel
and an annual budget of $278,655.34. Manning
schedules permitted a deployment of only 2.8
patrol units per watch. Under the proposed con-
tract with the county, 32 personnel would have
been affiliated. All would have received an increase
in pay, this increase ranging from $18 to $76 per
month. The county agreed to deploy an average of
3.1 patrol units per watch to provide this service
at an annual saving of $41,839.34. The West
Covina City Council rejected this contract plan
and retained its own police department.
At the time of its survey, the city of Signal Hill
had a population of 6,604. Its police department
had a complement of 17 personnel and manning
schedules permitted the deployment of 1 patrol
unit per watch. The city's annual budget was
$168,815. Under the proposed contract system, 12
of the personnel would have been affiliated with
the county. The county agreed to deploy the
2
o WEST COVINA SURVEY, OP. Cir.
21 Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, SUR-
VEY OF POLICE SERVICES FOR THE CITY OF . IGNAL
HILL, Match 20, 1959, hereinafter referred to as the
SIGNAL HILL SURVEY.2 2 
WEST COVINA SURVEY, p. 10.
IBID.
21 IBID.
equivalent of 1.2 patrol units per watch. The
contract plan permitted a saving to the city of
$74,735 per year. All affiliated employees were to
receive salary increases ranging from 823 to S98
per month 5
On April 7, 1959, the City Council of Signal
Hill-by a vote of 4 to 1-agreed to accept the
police contract plan and to affiliate eligible mem-
bers of its Police Department with the County.
Shortly thereafter, citizen groups qualified a
petition to refer the Council's resolution to a
referendum. A recall election was also initiated
against the four councilmen who had voted for the
acceptance of the contract. The subsequent
election resulted in the recall of the four council-
men. The resolution accepting the contract was
defeated in the referendum by a ratio of eight to
three. Members of the Council who were elected
to replace the unseated members voted unani-
mously to reverse the previous decision. After
slightly more' than one year of operation, the
county's contract with Signal Hill was ended.2
On July 1, 1960, a new Signal Hill Police Depart-
ment was established. Interestingly enough, the
former Chief of the department, who affiliated
with the County at the rank of Lieutenant,
decided to remain with the Sheriff's Department
in that position.
The developments in West Covina and in Signal
Hill, particularly, haVe intriguing implications.
On-the-spot observation by the author-of the
contract system operating in Los Angeles County-
has convinced the author of its success. Discussion
with police officials, with city administrators, and
with community leaders has confirmed the sound-
ness of the approach. The sysfem is not perfect, of
course, and day-to-day problems arise; these
arise, however, in any human endeavor. It is
significant that in more than six years of operation
the police contract system has grown in scope and
significance. Investigation in Los Angeles has failed
to uncover any contract city which is seriously
contemplating withdrawing -from the plan. The
only contract which has been lost was with the only
city that had previously had its own police depart-
ment.
in light of Signal Hill's withdrawal from the
scheme, certain questions arise. Where existing
police agencies are costly and inadequate, what
are the chances of achieving functional integration
21 SIGNAL HILL SURVEY, p. 23.
26 Trygg, C. E., "Police and fire departments re-
established after Signal Hill tries contract services,
WESTERN CITY MAGAZINE, 37:17-8 (Jan., 1961).
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through the absorption of these departments? Do
-erious obstacles remain even after sati.factory
resolution of the personnel features of such a plan?
Why is- the control of police agencies peculiarly
attractive to the political leaders of local com-
munities? Is this control particularly attractive
to the leaders, both elective and appointive, of
_-maller communities? If the realization of such
a plan requires voter approval, what are the
chances of citizens making a rational decision in
this area?
CONCLuSIoN-THE FUTURE OF POLICE
SERVICE CONTRACTS
Police service contracts represent a convenient,
economical, and practical solution to many of the
problems of police integration. Since they are
voluntary instruments, police service contracts
hold more promise than do some more "ideal"
approaches to the problems of metropolitan or
regional law enforcement. This instrument may
be used not only to integrate law enforcement
within a particular metropolitan area or region,
but also to provide a coordinated police program
to an area which lacks the resources to build such
a program of its own. The advantages of contract
services are just as applicable to cities of more
than 50,000 population as they are to the smaller
communities. Areas with less than 100,000 popula-
tion which are just incorporating might seriously
consider this plan as an alternative to establishing
their own police department. An effective police
agency, after all, evolves; it is not created over-
night. The police departments of few newly
incorporated cities can claim a law enforcement
program which is as versatile, as economical, and
which has as wide a scope as does the contract
police program of Lakewood.
The examples included within this paper are
limited to illustrations of the county as a contract
agency. The contract system is not, however,
limited to county-city contracts. There are exam-
pies of city-city contracts, and the Atlanta Police
Department performs contract services for Fulton
Countv. To be successful, the contract system
must be germinated and achieved in an atmosphere
of mutual respect, understanding, and good faith
between contract bodies. To be successful, con-
tract services must be based upon long-term
planning. They should not be viewed simply as
an expedient, or stop-gap approach. Law enforce-
ment is too vital a governmental function to be
entrusted to mere expediency.
Implicit in the study of contract police services
are considerations of the role of the police in a
democratic society, of popular control of police
agencies, of communication between those policed
and those who do the policing. Law enforcement
has been one of the last governmental functions
to develop as a contract service. This is due perhaps
to the nature of the police function itself, and to
the fact that its services are not as easily measured
as are other public services. It is also due to the
reluctance of citizens in many areas to give up
their autonomy on police matters. Study of the
evolution of contract police services will uncover
further implications relative to the police function
in a free society.
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